I’ve lately done a lot at:
My Philosophy – multiple relative product theory of belief
I’m kind of worn out.
I need, after a little rest, to study modal logic and type theory more.
Also, I want to read and re-read a lot of things – both philosophical and non-philosophical.
I hope with my newly developed ideas, things will make sense that did not make sense before!
I want to consider the idea of co-referentiallity of two ideas.
Suppose Quine believes the_idea_of_Jove and the_idea_of_Jupiter mean different things.
How are we to represent this? It it itself (or rather co-referentiallity itself a primitive)?
Can we define it thus:
co-referenieal(Quine, quines_idea_of_Jove, quines_idea_of_Jupiter)
iff there is an X and
there is a meaning relation between Quine, quines_idea_of_of_Jove and X
and
there is a meaning relation between Quine, quines_idea_of_of_Jupiter and X
This does define co-referential OK.
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But Quine need not believe co-referential ideas are co-referential.
Apply the definition of belief.
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For Quine to believe quines_idea_of_Jove to be co_referential with quines_idea_of Jupiter:
There would need to be:
A belief_private of Quine’s between quines_idea_of_co-referentiallity, quines_idea_of_quines_idea_of_Jove, and quines_idea_of_quines_idea_of_Jupiter
and
Quine having a meaning relation between quines_idea_of_quines_idea_of_Jove and quines_idea_of_Jove
and also
Quine having a meaning relation between quines_idea_of_quines_idea_of_Jupiter and quines_idea_of_Jupiter
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There is no problem of intersubstitution here – (quines_idea_of_Jove and quines_idea_of_Jupiter are distinct – whether or not Jove and Jupiter are identical.)
Quine may, logically, believe the co-referentiallity of these either true or false.
Whether is belief is true depends on whether, in fact, they are co-referential.
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Also We can define Russell believes Quine believes words “Jove” and “Jupiter” are co-referential (or not).
I think one need only follow the previous definitions.
I believe that all the positions in the relations that I define “belief” in terms of are themselves referentially transparent, although, in cases, the defined relation has positions that are opaque. Or at least something akin to it.
This means they must sufficiently analyzed – not completely analyzed – we do not know enough for that.
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“Quine believes_public that Jupiter is a planet”
For me this is analyzed:
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1) There is a psychological relation of believing_private of Quine, the_idea_of_being_a_planet, and the idea_of_Jupiter.
2) There is a relation of meaning between Quine , the_idea_of_being_a_planet and the universal being_a_planet
3) There is a relation of meaning between Quine , the_idea_of_Jupiter and Jupiter.
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If Quine expresses this belief, then also:
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4) There is a saying relation between Quine and the words “is a planet” and the word “Jupiter”
5) There is a expressing relation between Quine the words “is a planet” and the_idea_of_being_a planet.
6) There is an expressing relation between Quine the word “Jupiter” and the_idea_of_Jupiter.
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We will suppose all of the above is true. Then according to my analysis:
“Quine believes_public that Jupiter is a planet”
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Now, suppose Jupiter = Jove, but Quine does not know it.
7) There is not a psychological relation of believing_private of Quine, the_idea_of_being_a_planet, and the idea_of_Jove. (It is logically possible that there could be – we are just supposing otherwise.)
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This is OK
8) For the_idea_of_Jove is not = the_idea_of_Jupiter.
It is true:
9) There is a relation of meaning between Quine , the_idea_of_being_a_planet and the universal being_a_planet
10) There is a relation of meaning between Quine , the_idea_of_Jupiter and Jupiter.
11) There is a relation of meaning between Quine , the_idea_of_Jupiter and Jove. (Quine does not realize it)
12) There is a relation of meaning between Quine , the_idea_of_Jove and Jupiter. (Quine does not realize it)
13) There is a relation of meaning between Quine , the_idea_of_Jove and Jove.
11) and 12) follow from intersubtituitivity.
Because of 1) 9) and 12) Quine believes_public that Jove is a planet.
Also suppose
14) There is a psychological relation of believing_private of Quine, the_idea_of_not_being_a_planet, and the idea_of_Jove.
Quine, not knowing Jove = Jupiter, would not know either of:
15) There is a relation of meaning between Quine , the_idea_of_Jupiter and Jove.
16) There is a relation of meaning between Quine , the_idea_of_Jove and Jupiter.
even though they are true.
But it is still true that
from 14) 2) and 13) that Quine believes_public that Jove is not a planet.
and from
1) 2) and 12) that Quine believes_public that Jove is a planet.
also because of 12) 2) and 11)
Quine believes_public that Jupiter is not a planet.
But all the terms of the relations believe_private, and the meaning relations are intersubstitutable salva veritate. It is only the defined relation believe_public that seems to have a problem.
And Quine will be unaware of his contradictory beliefs, as he does not know his ideas of Jove & Jupiter refer to the same object. He would not be in a position to infer just any proposition, as he apparently could if he were aware of the contradiction. I think we only reason from our private beliefs, although we assume a correspondence between our ideas and objects. Others may see his problem. And he may become aware of it, and correct himself. It is itself not a contradiction to say someone has contradictory beliefs. I think the situation no worse than any other false belief. Also better to have this sort of intensionality than none.