

On Tarski
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I recently read Alfred Tarski's "The Semantic Conception of Truth", in Leonard Linsky's Collection, Semantics and the Philosophy of Language. I have some reactions. One is that the left hand side of the relation in

X is true if, and only if, p.

is merely a name for a bunch of marks or sounds.

These are meaningless outside speakers of a language.

Tarski himself basically says this early on (page 14).

And moreover, Tarski uses the convention of quotation to hide this.

E.g.:

The sentence "snow is white" is true, if, and only if, snow is white.

Appears very different from

The sentence George is true, if, and only if, snow is white.

But, in his theory, they are grammatically the same.

Names are arbitrary. He has hidden this with a naming convention.

In my paper that I gave at the last BRS meeting, it would be represented.

A asserts truly that “white”(“snow”) =df $(\exists f, x) \text{ says}(A, \text{“white”}, \text{“snow”}) \ \& \ R_A(\text{“white”}, f) \ \& \ R_A(\text{“snow”}, x) \ \& \ (\iota \phi)(S_A(f, \phi)) \ ((\iota u)(S_A(x, u)))$

The bearers of meaning correspond to words, not sentences, with some exceptions (mostly idioms).

We could never have enough names for individual sentences. (other than a convention such as quotation).

Tarski talks about the Liar paradox on pages 19 and 20.

Also, note that on the page in Russell’s working paper “On Substitution”, in CPBR volume 5, where he considered a theory very close to mine, he was working on a solution to the Liar paradox. It is difficult, but I will try to revisit it in the future.