Copyright (C) 2019 Dennis Joe Darland
I’ve partially worked out my philosophy in WildLIFE (a language which is for the most part a superset of Prolog).
My port of WildLIFE is now on github. There are intoductions to Prolog here. The latest WildLIFE version of my philosophy can be viewed here.
An intro to WildLIFE is here.
The WildLIFE handbook is here.
My thoughts are becoming clearer. Belief as ordinarily expressed about objects is indeed opaque. But, in my philosophy, it is defined in terms of other relations, of none is opaque. There are the rrrr (R on this site) and ssss (S) relations. Also rrss = R | S. I also use believes_in_words and believes_in_ideas. We can be mistaken about the relata od the ssss (S) relation. In language we can only use the referents of the rrrr (R) relation. In thought we can only use the referents of the ssss (S) relation (generally the same as relata of the rrrr (R) relation). Although we can be mistaken about the relata of the S relation, we are often practically certain. But we can imagine cases such as Quine’s example involving tom.
It all boils down to
(for tom)
1) tom_cicero_idea S cicero
and
2) tom_tully_idea S tully
by substitutivity of identity.
3) tom_cicero_idea S tully
and
4) tom_tully_idea S cicero
(there would not be 2 & 3 in WildLIFE – there could not be a distinct atom tully.
Tom would not admit 3 & 4, but they would be true.
It is impossible that there exist tully = cicero in WildLIFE.
But one can have separate ideas, tom_tully_idea & som_cicero_ idea, such that:
(for tom)
tom_tully_idea S cicero
and
tom_cicero_idea S cicero
S is a many-one relation.
In WildLIFE or Prolog, 2 atoms are never equal. Thus there is only one atom for Cicero. However, I use multiple atoms for ideas of Cicero. And 2 words, (cicero_word and tully_word). It then turns out that tom has contradictory beliefs about Cicero. But tom would have no way to know this as it is based on an identity represented in an identity of atoms (the objects). – not his own ideas or words. In logic, the situation would be better represented with Russell’s definition of definite descriptions. Tom would have beliefs given in terms of two descriptions. Then there would be a question whether the two descriptions described the same object. See Principia Mathematica *14.03. This would not solve the problem for Quine because he took relations extensionally, but I do not, nor did Russell. Otherwise, definite descriptions do not solve what Russell expressed as one of its main motivations. See The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol 4, p. 414, and vol 5, p. xli.
To solve the problem perfectly, I think we could only use names (even predicates) for objects which we could not make identity mistakes. This was Russell’s theory of acquaintance. I do not accept that, I think any judgement is fallible. Although doubt, often, is practically unreasonable.
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